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Abstract—As demands increase to use unmanned aircraft 
systems (UAS) for a broad spectrum of commercial applications, 
regulatory authorities are examining how to safely integrate 
them without compromising safety or disrupting traditional 
airspace operations. For small UAS, several operational rules 
have been established; e.g., do not operate beyond visual line-of-
sight, do not fly within five miles of a commercial airport, do not 
fly above 400 ft above ground level. Enforcing these rules is 
challenging for UAS, as evidenced by the number of incident 
reports received by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). 
This paper reviews the development of an onboard system – 
Safeguard – designed to monitor and enforce conformance to a 
set of operational rules defined prior to flight (e.g., geospatial 
stay-out or stay-in regions, speed limits, and altitude constraints). 
Unlike typical geofencing or geo-limitation functions, Safeguard 
operates independently of the off-the-shelf UAS autopilot and is 
designed in a way that can be realized by a small set of verifiable 
functions to simplify compliance with existing standards for 
safety-critical systems (e.g. for spacecraft and manned 
commercial transportation aircraft systems). A framework is 
described that decouples the system from any other devices on 
the UAS as well as introduces complementary positioning 
source(s) for applications that require integrity and availability 
beyond what can be provided by the Global Positioning System 
(GPS). 
This paper summarizes the progress and test results for 
Safeguard research and development since presentation of the 
design concept at the 35th DASC (2016). Significant 
accomplishments include completion of software verification and 
validation in accordance with NASA standards for spacecraft 
systems (to Class B), development of improved hardware 
prototypes, development of a simulation platform that allows for 
hardware-in-the-loop testing and fast-time Monte Carlo 
evaluations, and flight testing on multiple air vehicles. 
Integration testing with NASA’s UAS Traffic Management 
(UTM) service-oriented architecture was also demonstrated. 
Keywords—geofencing; Unmanned Aircraft System; formal 
methods; UAS Traffic Management (UTM) 
I. INTRODUCTION  
UAS have diverse designs and performance capabilities, 
with corresponding diversity in safety risk. Some differences in 
UAS are obvious, such as the size, weight, or configuration of 
the aircraft. Other differences are more subtle, such as the 
frangibility of the structures and materials or the provenance of 
the components. While these vehicle differences affect safety 
risk, the operational context—especially the environment in 
which a UAS flies—also affects safety risk for UAS, more so 
than for conventional commercial aircraft. UAS have the 
potential for causing catastrophic harm to people, other aircraft, 
and property when they operate in prohibited areas or beyond 
their authorized range. Operation in no-fly zones can result 
from intentional or uninformed actions on the part of the pilot 
or from loss of system capability (e.g., loss of position data, 
autopilot failure, or loss of command and control capability). 
According to the FAA, reports of inappropriate drone 
operations have increased dramatically over the past two years, 
with the FAA receiving over 100 such reports each month [1].  
To mitigate these risks, the FAA provides information on 
restrictions and requirements in effect at specific locations and 
has implemented Part 107 of the Federal Aviation Regulations 
for small UAS operations.   Most of the requirements in Part 
107 specify operational limitations in lieu of levying vehicle-
specific requirements; for example, constraining operations to 
visual line-of sight, daylight-only, 400 ft altitude above ground 
level, and maximum groundspeed of 87 knots [2].  In 
conventional aircraft, the onboard pilot is primarily responsible 
for conforming to operational limitations. Ensuring 
conformance to operational limitations for UAS presents some 
challenges due to dependence on UAS operators who may lack 
sufficient aviation safety knowledge and experience and/or on 
automation that does not have the same safety provenance of 
conventional aviation automation. This has given rise to a need 
for novel systems and equipment to assure safe UAS 
operations. Geofencing systems are one example. 
In this paper, geofencing refers to constraining UAS flight 
to an airspace defined by geographical and altitude limits 
(providing a stay-in function) and/or preventing a UAS from 
entering prohibited airspace (providing a stay-out function). 
Geofencing is not a novel concept for UAS [3][4].  Geofencing 
has been recognized as fundamental to mitigating safety risk by 
the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) in their 
proposed rulemaking for UAS [5], [6], by the American 
Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) F38 working group 
[7] and in plans for UAS traffic management (UTM) [8]. While 
home-built UAS and those used by hobbyists may not have a 
geofencing system, a number of commercial UAS do come 
with some degree of built-in geofencing capability [9], [10].  
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20170009617 2019-08-31T01:51:59+00:00Z
 Sightings of UAS operating in prohibited areas speaks to 
the need for more reliable geofencing, and there are known 
technical factors that affect the reliability of embedded 
geofencing systems. For example, geofences used in 
commercial UAS are typically embedded with the autopilot, 
using the same computer processor and operating system.  For 
autopilots that lack the provenance of conventional avionics 
systems (e.g., open source autopilots), establishing confidence 
in the reliability of the geofence can be challenging [11], [12].  
Further, most geofencing functions rely on global navigation 
satellite systems (GNSS) for positioning. Space-based radio 
frequency systems share many common failure modes due to 
issues such as multipath, signal attenuation, and shadowing, 
creating another single point of failure. The use of GNSS alone 
cannot guarantee accurate, reliable geo-referenced positioning 
essential for maintaining geo-containment.  
To rely on geofencing to prevent unintended flight beyond 
safe areas, geofencing systems should meet some level of 
assurance for reliability and dependability. Likewise, 
automation to ensure conformance with other operational 
limitations, such as speed limits and altitude constraints, should 
be reliable.  This paper identifies some preliminary 
considerations for developing a reliable onboard system for 
geofencing and describes the development and flight testing of 
a prototype system intended to meet high design assurance 
levels. This work is expected to extend to enhanced 
functionality for ensuring conformance to a broader set of 
operational limitations. 
II. DERIVING CONSIDERATIONS FOR GEOFENCING FUNCTIONS 
 
Reliable geofencing functionality depends critically on 
having correct and timely information on all geospatial 
boundaries and limitations relevant to a UA’s operation [6].  
The data aspects are recognized as an important role for UTM 
systems [8].  Reliable geofencing functionality also depends on 
having an avionics system that can act dependably on that data 
to ensure conformance with applicable geo-limitations.  In this 
section, we focus on the latter. 
A recent study of airworthiness requirements for UAS 
identified failure to stay within authorized geo-limitations as a 
potentially catastrophic hazard [13]. To mitigate the hazard, an 
independent, onboard geofencing system was proposed.  
Design and performance criteria were suggested for developing 
the system as a starting point for establishing risk-based 
requirements for geofencing systems. The criteria for 
geofencing as shown here could be easily extended for other 
conformance criteria: 
C.1 Data integrity.  A means to check the validity, 
timeliness, and security of the geo-limitation data 
should be provided (e.g., validity of the data sources 
and suitability of data for the detection algorithms). 
C.2 Position data availability and accuracy. Sufficient data 
should be available to estimate the UAS position at all 
times.  The accuracy should be sufficient to ensure that 
the UAS will not breach the geo-limits. 
C.3 Situational awareness. Awareness of the UAS position 
relative to the geo-limits should be maintained. 
C.4 Detection.  The means of detecting boundary violations 
should monitor all defined boundaries and recognize 
impending violations in sufficient time for action to 
avoid breaching the geo-limits. 
C.5 Pilot alerting. Quick acting means should be provided 
to alert the pilot in command if pilot action is required. 
Timing thresholds for alerts should consider the time 
needed to transmit and process data, for annunciation, 
and for human response. 
C.6 Avoidance. The means of avoiding breach of any geo-
limits should ensure the UAS remains within the 
established geo-limits at all times. Latency and 
availability of any command and control datalink 
should be considered, if pilot action is required. 
C.7 Collateral damage. Events wherein release of high 
energy parts (e.g., from midsize rotorcraft) outside the 
geo-limits may constitute a hazard should be 
considered in detecting impending violations. 
C.8 Interference. Performance should not be degraded by 
any form of interference including, but not limited to 
electromagnetic interference from systems internal or 
external to the UAS. 
C.9 Dependencies. Dependencies on external infrastructure 
such as GNSS or systems internal to the UAS (e.g., 
autopilot, power, and datalinks) should be considered in 
evaluation of reliability and security. 
 
A prototype geofencing system, called Safeguard, was 
developed with these considerations in mind.  The following 
sections describe the system and how it relates to the design 
criteria, considerations for assuring performance, and recent 
flight test results.  
III. A PROTOTYPE GEOFENCING SYSTEM 
Safeguard is an independent geofencing system to support 
UTM for small to midsize UAS [14].  Safeguard is a simplex 
architecture [11], [15]: a very simple system that constrains the 
geospatial behavior of a more complex system—the 
autopilot—that is more difficult and costly to certify.  The core 
functionality is based on determining whether the position of 
the UAS is inside or outside a set of polygons that represent the 
geo-limitations for the operation. Geo-limitations may be 
defined as stay-in regions (authorized or safe areas) or stay-out 
regions (restricted or hazardous areas).  As per C.1 and C.2, the 
geo-limitation data and position data for the UAS are critical 
for an effective geofencing function. 
In Safeguard, three boundaries are established for each stay-
in and stay-out region: a hard boundary (the geo-limit), a 
terminate boundary, and a warning boundary. These are 
illustrated in Figure 1 for simple square regions. These 
boundaries help provide situational awareness with respect to 
the proximity of the UAS to geo-limits (per C.3).  The hard 
boundary (in red in Figure 1) is a user-defined polygon 
representing a safe area that should never be breached. Points 
that define hard boundaries are loaded prior to flight. Polygons 
may be any shape or size, as long as the polygon is closed (i.e., 
 the start-point and end-point are coincident and no boundaries 
intersect). There may be only one stay-in region per operation, 
but many stay-out regions.  
 
Figure 1. Boundaries for Geospatial Constraint Conformance.  
The terminate and warning boundaries (in yellow and green 
respectively) indicate buffers based on the vehicle’s state and 
its’ aerodynamic characteristics. The warning boundary defines 
the points when a notice will be issued to the remote pilot, 
autopilot, or other systems indicating that the vehicle is 
approaching a terminate boundary. The warning allows the 
UAS to attempt a contingency maneuver to avoid flight 
termination. The size of the buffers depend on the maximum 
distance (ε) that the UAS could travel if flight termination were 
initiated.  The warning boundaries dynamically change as a 
function of ε multiplied by a tunable scale factor ρ (ρ>1). The 
scaling factor provides operators flexibility with respect to 
desired proximity to terminate boundaries, including 
consideration of collateral damage from release of high energy 
parts (per C.7 Collateral Damage). 
If the UAS crosses the terminate boundary, loss of control or 
unrecoverable fly away is assumed and flight termination can 
be initiated to avoid breaching the hard boundary.  Establishing 
terminate boundaries at a distance ε from hard boundaries 
ensures that flight termination (e.g. by cutting power) will 
prevent violations of geo-limits (per C.6).  
The system architecture for Safeguard is shown in Figure 2.  
Prior to flight, stay-in and stay-out boundary coordinates, 
vehicle dynamics parameters, and an optional flight plan are 
loaded. In the current prototype, this data is loaded by the 
operator, but may be automated through a service provider or 
UTM system in the future. 
  
 
 
Figure 2. System Architecture. 
 
 
Because of the functional importance of valid and correct 
geo-referenced hard boundary points, all such data are 
captured, processed, and transferred in accordance with 
appropriate Data Processing Assurance Levels (DPAL) [17] for 
similar types of data used on commercial aircraft (e.g., 
navigation data).  This provides a check on data integrity per 
C.1. 
Once initialized, Safeguard continuously monitors the UAS 
position to predict breaches of the defined boundaries (per 
C.2). Multiple sources of positioning data are used to mitigate 
accuracy and availability problems that can occur with GPS.  
In addition, two different methods are used to detect 
impending boundary violations per C.4:  ray casting and 
winding numbers. With each update, the warning and 
terminate lines are set to either “compliant” or “violation”. 
These lines usually are connected to two separate elements of 
 the UAS. The warning line is typically connected to a system 
that has control authority of the UAS, such as the autopilot or 
a contingency management function such as ICAROUS [16], 
to allow that system to initiate a contingency maneuver to 
avoid flight termination. Because off-the-shelf systems may 
fail, the terminate line is connected to a separate high integrity 
termination mechanism. Appropriate termination mechanisms 
will depend on specified limitations within the operational 
area (stay-in region), but may include options such as 
triggering parachute deployment or cutting power to the 
motors.  
IV. ASSURANCE APPROACH 
Developing a highly reliable geofencing system capable of 
meeting aviation grade safety standards was a goal from the 
outset. Meeting such a goal entailed strategies to overcome the 
technical challenges described in Section I, plus assurance 
measures to provide confidence and evidence that Safeguard 
could meet design and performance requirements.  Having an 
independent system coupled with a simple architecture that 
could facilitate compliance (and ultimately certification) with 
aviation safety standards was considered crucial to making a 
reliable system at a price point suitable for the current UAS 
market.     
After validating initial research prototypes of Safeguard as 
described in Dill et. al. [14], the Safeguard system was taken 
to the next level of technical readiness by developing the 
Safeguard software in compliance with NASA’s safety 
standards for Class B software (for mission critical, non-
human space flight) [18]. Compliance with the Class B 
standards required detailed documentation of the system and 
software requirements, risk assessment, and extensive 
verification and quality assurance activities. According to 
[19], “software assurance assists in risk mitigation by 
minimizing defects and preventing problems and, through its 
activities, enables improvement of future products and 
services.” This level of assurance may not be necessary for all 
UAS missions, but may be necessary when operational risk 
assessment determines that staying within specified geo-
limitations is safety-critical.  In those cases, Safeguard can 
provide a safety net for conventional geofencing systems. 
The following subsections provide additional detail 
relevant to assurance for the three main elements of the 
Safeguard system: (1) the positioning system, (2) the 
boundary database, and (3) the boundary monitoring and 
violation detection software.  
A. Positioning System Performance 
For the Safeguard system to reliably and independently 
perform its function, accurate and timely position estimates 
are critical. Positioning data for manned aircraft are available 
from a myriad of independent systems such as GNSS, very 
high frequency omnidirectional range (VOR) stations, 
distance measuring equipment (DME), tactical air navigation 
(TACAN) stations, and high quality inertial navigation 
systems (INSs). Redundancy is typically employed to mitigate 
potential failures and ensure continuous operation. 
Unfortunately, low altitude operations can cause ground-based 
radio systems to be unobservable due to line of sight issues. 
Moreover, most UAS employ sensors selected for low weight 
and cost, which typically results in a lower performing 
positioning system consisting of a GNSS receiver and a lower-
grade inertial measurement unit (IMU).  Because of GNSS 
vulnerabilities such as signal attenuation, jamming, and 
multipath, the available sensors cannot be relied upon for 
safety critical applications, even if methods such as those 
shown in [20] are employed. For Safeguard to be an effective 
monitor, the performance of its positioning system must be 
better than the performance of the positioning system 
embedded within the UAS. As such, Safeguard has been 
designed to operate with a secondary independent positioning 
system. For current testing and proof-of-concept, a Locata® 
[21] local positioning system was chosen as the alternative 
PNT system (APNT). Locata® uses a network of small, 
ground-based transmitters to provide radio-positioning signals, 
independent of GPS.  Other APNT systems will be evaluated 
in the future. 
B. Boundary Database Integrity 
The second essential input to the detection algorithm is the 
set of geospatial and other constraints that are specified pre-
flight and loaded onto the Safeguard unit. Of these, the most 
complex and vulnerable to errors are the polygons that 
represent the hard boundaries (i.e., no-fly zones). Fortunately, 
there are several established industry standards for assuring the 
content and quality of these types of data. These standards 
were established for commercial transport aircraft that utilize 
similar geospatial data for navigation and situation awareness 
systems, where probability of failure must be very low. The 
procedures for assuring integrity of the Safeguard databases 
leverage guidance from six such standards [17][22][23][24] 
[25][26].  
Standards for processing data that are to be used onboard 
aircraft are defined in [17]. Any data to be acquired, processed, 
and loaded onto an aircraft system should comply with this 
standard, as well as guidance provided in [25]. The primary 
intents are to assure that (a) the data provided meets all of the 
requirements for its intended use, and (b) data has not been 
altered or corrupted since origination. Seven quality 
characteristics are established in [17] wherein evidence must 
be provided to support the claims of the designer with respect 
to meeting the system’s data quality requirements. These are: 
1. Accuracy – The degree of conformance between the 
estimated or measured value and its true value 
2. Resolution – The number of units or digits to which a 
measured or calculated value is expressed and used 
3. Assurance Level – The degree of confidence that a data 
element is not corrupted while stored or in transmission 
4. Traceability – The degree that a system or a data 
product can provide a record of the changes made to 
that product and thereby enable an audit trail to be 
followed from the end-user to the data originator 
5. Timeliness – The degree of confidence that the data is 
applicable to the period of its intended use 
 6. Completeness – The degree of confidence that all of 
the data needed to support the intended use is provided 
7. Format – The structure of data elements, records and 
files arranged to meet standards, specifications or data 
quality requirements 
For Safeguard, the requirements for six of these are given 
in [17][22][23][24] and are assumed to be sufficient for most 
missions. Characteristic #3 is referred to as the Data Processing 
Assurance Level (DPAL) and, per the standard, may be one of 
three levels (1, 2, or 3); with “1” being the highest degree of 
confidence. Typically, the DPAL will correspond to the Design 
Assurance Level (DAL) associated with the software that uses 
the database [27]. For example, a DPAL of “1” corresponds to 
a DAL of “A” and “B” (that is, software whose anomalous 
behavior could contribute to a catastrophic or hazardous failure 
condition). 
As with positioning system performance, it is expected that 
the DPAL requirement for pre-loaded data in Safeguard will 
vary across missions and operating environments based on the 
level of risk deemed acceptable with respect to violating 
prescribed constraints (e.g., hard boundaries). For research and 
development purposes, we assume the most stringent will be 
required (DPAL 1). The method to achieve DPAL 1 will 
depend on whether the data originates locally via a process 
managed and performed by the operator, or the data is provided 
as a service from a certified source. Details on both of these 
methods will be published separately. 
C. Verification of Boundary Detection Software 
Assuring the accuracy and behavior of the algorithms for 
detecting proximity to and violation of geo-limitations is 
central to a reliable system.  To support the creation of highly-
assured algorithms, the boundary detection and violation 
prediction functions in Safeguard were developed and verified 
using formal methods [28].  In particular, the Prototype 
Verification System (PVS) was used to specify and verify the 
algorithms. Using PVS enabled the identification of corner 
cases, such as problematic geometries, increasing the 
robustness of the algorithms.  Additional verification activities 
included extensive testing both in simulation and flight. 
As it is not practical to terminate a multitude of vehicles, a 
UAS simulation capability developed at NASA Langley is 
being leveraged. This simulation enables testing and 
refinement of the software functionality in an accelerated and 
benign fashion. The simulator allows for accelerated Monte 
Carlo evaluations across a span of input uncertainties and other 
failure modes without having to physically crash any UAS.    
Monte Carlo evaluations have been conducted for each 
formally verified function. 
V. FLIGHT TESTING AND RESULTS 
The flight test plan for Safeguard includes five primary 
objectives: (1) demonstrate correct performance in nominal 
conditions across different vehicle types, including small 
rotary-wing and fixed-wing UAS; (2) demonstrate correct 
functionality during periods of degraded GPS performance, 
including loss of GPS; (3) evaluate alternate termination 
strategies; (4) demonstrate integration with the UTM system 
and services; and (5) demonstrate correct functionality when 
operating beyond visual line-of-sight.  
Flight tests have been and are being conducted using 
Safeguard on a number of UAS platforms.  The current 
Safeguard prototype, shown in Figure 3, uses the Class B 
software and commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware.  This 
unit has been installed and flown on numerous multi-rotor 
platforms. For this integration, the warning line was connected 
to the vehicle’s autopilot, while the terminate line was 
connected to either a system that forces the vehicle to land or a 
mechanism which simply disconnects power to the UAS’ 
motors. While an action such as the discontinuation of 
propulsion is intended as a termination action for some 
Safeguard applications, many of the flight tests were conducted 
with the termination line triggering an action to land to prevent 
perpetual damage to test vehicles. Based on the vehicle’s 
mission environment and risk tolerance, various other 
termination mechanisms can be employed and are being 
considered for future tests. Efforts to reduce the overall size of 
the unit and enhance ruggedness are also underway. 
 
 
Figure 3. Current Safeguard Prototype 
Recent tests have focused on flight test objectives 2, 4 and 
5, using an octocopter platform flown on the campus of NASA 
LaRC. Test flights were designed to verify intended 
functionality in a variety of missions and operational scenarios, 
as well as differing flight plans and altitudes. The number, 
complexity and types of boundaries for no-fly zones were also 
varied to cover a wide range across flight tests. To force 
Safeguard into scenarios with degraded GPS, many of the 
flight operations were conducted in close proximity to 
buildings to simulate urban environments. Additionally, all 
flight tests were conducted with connectivity to UTM services. 
The results of flight tests in two of the operational scenarios are 
given in the remainder of this section. A more comprehensive 
set of results will be published in the future. 
The first example operational scenario was designed to 
capture output signals from Safeguard while encountering the 
boundaries of a simple rectangular stay-in region. Figure 4 
shows this region covering part of the NASA LaRC campus.  
For this test Safeguard was not integrated with any other 
onboard system. Thus, no mitigating actions were taken to 
prevent excursions beyond the boundary. Various flight plans 
 were chosen such that the UAS crossed over the same 
boundary numerous times. This forced Safeguard’s internal 
state to vary and trigger all of its possible output modes. 
Example results of this type of test are shown in Figure 5 
where the flight data is colored to indicate Safeguard’s internal 
state and associated output signal: “safe” (green), “warning” 
(yellow), “terminate’ (red), and “violation” (black). Through 
analysis of data collected over a series of these tests, Safeguard 
was found to have functioned as designed with zero false 
alarms or missed detections. Furthermore, Figure 5 illustrates 
instances of the dynamically changing size of the warning and 
terminate buffers. Per the system design, warnings are 
triggered at different distances from the hard boundary due to 
variations in the platforms velocity when approaching the 
boundary.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Stay-in Region for Flight Tests above Langley 
Boulevard at NASA LaRC (Operational Scenario 1). 
 
 
Figure 5. Flight Results from Operational Scenario 1. 
 
A second example operational scenario, depicted in Figure 
6, evaluated performance using a single rectangular stay-in 
region along with multiple complex stay-out zones. The stay-in 
region was established to constrain flight to within close 
proximity of the intended operation above Dryden Street at 
NASA LaRC. The various stay-out regions were established to 
prevent the vehicle from flying into (or above) buildings or 
above intersections on the road. To prevent excursions beyond 
these operational boundaries, Safeguard’s warning line was 
setup to trigger a “bounce” maneuver (i.e. cease forward 
momentum, then move away from the encountered boundary), 
and the terminate output was configured to initiate an auto-
land. To visualize how the warning and terminate boundaries 
dynamically change during flight, Figure 7 shows a graphical 
comparison of each boundary location during two different 
instants of a flight at dissimilar speeds (left: 2 m/s, right: 6 m/s) 
and at an altitude of 30 m above ground level (AGL). 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Stay-in and Stay-out Regions for Flight Tests above 
Dryden Street at NASA LaRC (Operational Scenario 2). 
 
 
  
 
Figure 7. Warning and Terminate Buffers Dynamically Changing During Operational Scenario 2 at 2 m/s (left) and 6 m/s (right). 
 
 
 
Within the previously described environment, two different 
test situations were conducted. Both of these attempted to 
accomplish the same autonomously-flown flight plan at an 
altitude of 30 m AGL and a velocity of 8 m/s. This flight plan 
began at the south-western end of Dryden Street and traversed 
above the road in a north-eastern direction for approximately 
200 meters. This flight plan was purposefully designed to 
encounter the stay-out zone located at the intersection of 
Langley Boulevard and Dryden Street (Figure 7).  
For the first situation, all systems were left in a functional 
state and the results shown in Figure 8 were produced. As the 
UAS began to approach the stay-out zone above the 
intersection, Safeguard issued a warning signal and the multi-
rotor “bounced” away from the no-fly zone. Then, the aircraft 
re-attempted to complete its flight plan and was “bounced” off 
of the no-fly zone two additional times at slower velocities due 
to the loss of momentum after the initial encounter with the 
warning boundary. It can be seen that the vehicle’s initial 
encounter with the warning boundary occurred at a further 
distance from the stay-out zone than subsequent encounters. 
This is due to the vehicle’s reduced velocity after each bounce 
and re-try. Safeguard functionality during this test performed 
as expected, warning in sufficient time to allow the bounce 
maneuver to be executed and the vehicle to re-assess whether 
to continue the flight plan.   
 
 
Figure 8. Flight Results from Operational Scenario 2 with 
Warning Triggering "Bounce” Maneuvers. 
 
The second situation was designed to emulate a fly-away 
scenario as would occur with an autopilot failure. This allows 
for testing Safeguard’s flight termination signal. Example 
results of this test are depicted in Figure 9 where the autopilot 
ignores input commands, including Safeguard’s warning 
signal, and continues to travel toward the no-fly zone. Once the 
terminate boundary was reached, Safeguard triggered a vehicle 
termination thereby preventing a boundary violation in the 
presence of an autopilot failure.  
 
 
  
Figure 9. Flight Results from Operational Scenario 2 with 
Simulated Autopilot Failure and Terminate Signal Triggering 
Land Maneuver. 
 
VI. FUTURE WORK 
Work remains to be done to develop Safeguard to a level of 
technical readiness for certification and commercial use. 
While much attention has been paid to the software and 
software assurance, little effort has been devoted to hardware 
ruggedization.  Additional work is also needed to reduce size, 
weight, power and cost (SWAP-C) for some vehicles. Based 
on an analysis of the computing and sensor requirements for 
Safeguard, it is believed that a ruggedized version could be 
produced that is approximately 1”x2”x3”, with a weight of 
8oz and a nominal power consumption of 300mA. Steps are 
underway to achieve this via partnering discussions with 
manufacturers of similar devices, as well as using NASA in-
house expertise.  
 Additional work is also needed to refine the estimation of 
the minimum safe separation distance (MSSD) from hard 
boundaries to ensure that flight termination prevents any 
violation of no-fly zones. To improve the MSSD estimation, 
work is underway to better characterize vehicle dynamics. We 
believe that loading a small set of vehicle dynamics parameters 
may be sufficient to characterize each unique vehicle, rather 
than loading a high-fidelity aerodynamic model. While the 
current set of vehicle dynamics have been shown to adequately 
describe multiple UAS, additional testing is needed for a 
broader range of aircraft. Data captured during flight 
termination events may also help refine the MSSD estimation.  
Environmental factors, especially wind, can affect the 
MSSD estimate. One approach being explored is over-
bounding wind speeds and directions based on forecasts prior 
to flight. Flights may also be restricted from takeoff if winds 
exceed a certain threshold. 
Conducting test flights on different UAS types in various 
environmental conditions (e.g., in wind conditions and in 
rugged terrain with GPS dropouts) will be necessary to meet 
flight test objective 1.  These tests will also be used to confirm 
design considerations C.8 (interference) and C.9 (dependencies 
on other systems).  Flight test data is being used to verify that 
the system works as designed, and to validate data uncertainty 
models used in Monte Carlo simulations. Flight test data along 
with data gathered during simulations and NASA standards 
compliance evaluations are intended also to help develop a 
safety case for this type of technology.  
VII. CLOSING REMARKS 
Despite federal regulations on UAS operations and campaigns 
to inform and educate UAS pilots, incidents of inappropriate 
UAS operation continue. These incidents give rise to a need 
for solutions to assure safe operations for small to midsize 
UAS. Assured geofencing systems that enforce conformance 
to geo-limitations or other operational limitations have the 
potential to help advance integration of UAS safely in the near 
term.  Having an aviation-grade geofence can potentially 
reduce regulatory requirements on some UAS operations and 
enable operations in areas that are currently prohibited. The 
Safeguard system is one such development that could help 
facilitate the expansion of UAS operations by reliably keeping 
drones out of no-fly zones and other potentially hazardous 
environments.  
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